Turkey, EU, and the Armenian Genocide: A LAMP Analysis

    Who remembers now the destruction of the Armenians?
    Adolf Hitler, August 1939
    Introduction

The Republic of Turkey has long denied any involvement or fault in the Armenian Genocide, which can best be described as the systematic eradication of the Armenian culture and people from the Ottoman Empire, carried out through massacres and deportations which occurred, for the most part, during the years 1915 through 1917. Similar to the situation preceding the Jewish Holocaust that followed in the Genocide’s footsteps, Armenians occupied positions of power within Ottoman government and society at that time but, because of their ethnic and religious differences from the Turkish Muslim status quo, were targeted by groups motivated by fear of a rising Armenian influence as well as a swelling nationalistic desire to preserve said status quo. In the end, between 800,000 and possibly as many as 1.5 million people lost their lives to the nefarious ambitions of a crumbling empire (Kamiya 2007). Now, modern Turkey, which has emerged from the ashes of the Ottoman regime, and whose founders predicated principles of government and society inextricably mired in both the execution and subsequent denial of the Armenian Genocide, seeks entry into the European Union (EU).

It would, however, be an understatement to say that the Armenian Genocide is the only problem facing the prospect of Turkish accession as a full member nation of the EU. In fact, it is mostly a tangential issue to the more pressing matters of sweeping social and economic reforms which must take place before Turkey can even be considered. This, in addition to foreign policy challenges in Cyprus, confrontations with Turkey’s own Kurdish population, and additional problems with Armenia beyond the question of the historicity of the Genocide, has resulted in a situation in which “the road to Turkish membership in the EU will be long and difficult” (Gannon, Laipson et al. 2000).

The question of whether or not Turkey will be able to accomplish this objective in the long run is dependent on a multitude of variables and issues. The people, government, and economy of Turkey would all benefit greatly and are thus currently motivated to continue along the path of reform as dictated by the EU’s acquis communaitaire, or body of EU law accumulated to this point. But does Turkey’s insistence on denial of the Armenian Genocide represent some deeply submerged incompatibility with democratic law and society? Is the very act of denial an extension of the Genocide itself? And more importantly, is this how Turkey’s actions in respect to the Genocide will be perceived by the member nations of the EU when they are called upon at some point in the near future to approve or deny Turkey’s entry into the EU?

The specific question for this study then, is: how will Turkey’s stance on the Armenian Genocide affect the eventual Turkish accession vote of those EU member nations which place the greatest emphasis on Turkey’s role in the atrocity? Since a unanimous vote is required, any one member could, at least in theory, block Turkey’s entry into the EU indefinitely. This study will identify those nations most likely to act in this respect, and seek to determine to what degree their influence will have on Turkey’s fate.

LAMP Steps 1, 2, & 3:

Issues for Predictive Analysis

It can be said that there are really only two perspectives on the Armenian Genocide. One of those is Turkey’s, and the other would belong, for the most part, to the rest of the Western world. Turkey, of course, denies any wrongdoing on the part of its Ottoman predecessors, and while acknowledging that there were many unfortunate Armenian deaths, to include its own estimation of 300,000 persons who died due to “relocation”(Zarakol 2008), still insists on passing all of this off as the misfortunes of war. Thus, from this perspective, no genocide was ever committed and this continues to be the official Turkish stance.

On the other hand, the Armenian Genocide has been officially recognized by over twenty developed nations, and although the federal government of the US has not done likewise, due largely to pragmatic concerns over the current conflict in Iraq (Armtown 2007), the legislative bodies of 41 of its states have issued declarations to that effect. Even in situations where these declarative bills have been unsuccessful, the “arguments against such resolutions treat the fact of the genocide as a given” (Zarakol 2008). This is not to say that there are no dissenting voices challenging the historicity of the Armenian Genocide within those countries, but that the above viewpoint is generally accepted and openly discussed. Even still, within “Western intellectual circles” Turkey has very little support of its viewpoint (ICG 2007).

And it is this principle of freedom of expression which returns the focus to the link between the Genocide and EU accession. Because only in Turkey is it a criminal offense to openly discuss the Armenian Genocide in anything other than derogatory or dismissive terms. The act of doing so has been equated in Turkish courts to be “insulting Turkishness” and, as such, places the offender at risk of legal prosecution under Article 301 which stipulates in part that “public denigration of Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years” (Gültaşlı 2008). The “denigration of Turkishness” phrase is sufficiently ambiguous to have resulted in the prosecution of hundreds of individuals doing nothing more than peacefully expressing dissenting opinions.

For statements on the Armenian Genocide, both Orhan Pamuk, a Turkish Nobel Prize winning novelist, and Hrant Dink, a well respected Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor and author, have been convicted of this crime, though these convictions were later overturned on appeal. But for Dink, the outcome of the initial charges was disastrous as the highly sensationalized trial turned public opinion against him and eventually resulted in his murder by Turkish nationalist extremists (Gorvett 2007). Also, it is highly likely that state security officials were involved in the murder plot.

As of January 2008, however, Turkish lawmakers have recognized the conflict between Article 301 and the “freedom of expression” requirements of EU accession as dictated by the “Judiciary & Fundamental Rights” chapter of the acquis communaitaire and have amended Article 301 to omit the “denigration of Turkishness” clause as well as reducing the maximum term of imprisonment from three years to two. While this has been welcomed by some in the EU Enlargement Commission, a body that oversees the accession process, as a positive “step forward”, others have taken a more cautious approach, labeling it an “acceptable compromise” and holding off on a full assessment until implementation of the legislation is carried out (Gültaşlı 2008).

The difficulties Turkey has brought upon itself by first denying the Genocide ever took place, then by refusing to discuss it and by actively seeking to punish those who do, go against the grain of conventional thought on international relations. For instance, from a realist perspective, high politics, or matters relating to national security would have pre-eminence over ideological issues such as a debate over the Genocide (Viotti and Kauppi 1999). Yet Turkey has employed its instruments of state in drastic measures to prevent non-binding resolutions of foreign government’s recognition of a historical event, such as the events that took place prior to the defeat of US House of Representatives Resolution 106 in October 2007. In that case Turkey withdrew its ambassador to the US and threatened to withdraw its support of the US war in Iraq (Armtown 2007), and in the process possibly did irreparable damage to its relationship with one of its most valuable allies.

Turkish motivations are equally incongruous when viewed through the respective lenses of liberalism and globalism. The incentives for pre-meditated denial do not benefit any one group or coalition, nor do they bring about any form of economic advantage to Turkey in the worldwide capitalist system. The answer lies in the broader theoretical approach of constructivism whose proponents argue that national actors make their decision according to “what the world appears to be and how they conceive their roles in it” (Viotti and Kauppi 1999). In Turkey’s case, it appears that it, as an actor, is taking whatever steps are necessary to preserve its security by perpetuating denial. But this is not only the “national security” of the realist dogma, but the “ontological security” of constructivism.

Ontological security is tied to the preservation of “state identity”, and state identity is “produced and reproduced through interaction”. For Turkey to admit wrongdoing in the Armenian Genocide would be tantamount to rewriting its own history, a history that has defined it as a nation and people, is taught in its schools, and has been ever present in its foreign policy practices. This is how Turkey has faced the world since its modern inception and how it has acted to improve its perceived adoption of a European style of law, society, and government (Zarakol 2008). Consequently, asking Turkey for a reversal of course on this particular matter is much more difficult, and carries with it much more profound consequences, than would seem apparent on the surface.

But unfortunately for Turkey, those nations who will determine its fate in the EU are motivated by more conventional concerns such as national security, and political and economic capital. As such, their approach to Turkish accession has little room for sympathy regarding Turkey’s own internal angst about its past. And since, as mentioned previously, any one member nation in the EU could indefinitely block Turkey’s EU bid, this study will focus on those EU nations who are most concerned with Turkey’s stance on the Armenian genocide and possess the ability and fortitude to act on those concerns without readily succumbing to external pressure. Three nations stand out from the rest of the EU in this regard, those being Austria, France, and Germany.

Actors and Their Perspectives

Austria is Turkey’s most vocal adversary in the EU. As a “remnant of the Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian Empires, historical rivals of the Ottoman Empire”, there is much “bad blood” which is largely a result of the Ottoman Turks successive sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 (Pan 2005). Austria sees no benefit to Turkish accession, and its politicians garner much conservative support by appealing to the inherent enmity between the two peoples. As such, Austria can be expected to unilaterally oppose Turkey by any means available to it, and though the Armenian Genocide is not currently a hot-button political issue within Austria, it can be expected that it will implement the general condemnation of Turkey in the Western World due to the Armenian Genocide as another weapon in its arsenal to block Turkish efforts. This Armenian Genocide issue will be most effective for Austria in situation in which it stands in united condemnation of Turkey with other influential nations, such as France and Germany.

France, in particular, has made its views on the genocide quite clear, with both of its most recent presidents, Chirac and Sarkozy, stating that “Turkey will have to recognize the Armenian deaths as genocide before it joins the EU” (Candar 2006). In addition, it is one of the few nations that currently have plans to determine its vote on Turkish accession via referendum. In a poll taken in 2004, 56% of the French respondents stated they would vote against such a measure. However, 63% said they would support Turkish entry into the EU if it made “the necessary political and economic changes” (Henley 2004). So there is a definite potential for Turkey to make inroads with French public opinion, and recognition of the Armenian Genocide is directly associated with it.

Germany’s relationship with Turkey, in contrast to France’s and Austria’s overtly concealed antagonism, is more reminiscent of a partnership. The two nations have historically been allies in times of war, but this partnership is most pronounced in terms of economics, with an annual 14 billion euros in bilateral trade accounting for 14 percent of Turkish exports and 17 percent of German exports. Germany also has a sizeable contingent of 2.5 million Turkish immigrants, of which 600,000 have already obtained German citizenship (EurActiv 2007). Even so, the German government has not strongly supported Turkey’s bid for EU accession. This is partly because when it comes to the matter of Turkish involvement in the Armenian Genocide, Germany has also taken an aggressive stance. Its legislative body, the Bundestag, passed a resolution in 2005 calling on Turkey to “take historic responsibility for the massacres of Armenians by the Ottoman Turkish government and ask forgiveness from the descendants of the victims” (DW-World 2005).

This resolution is a product of the majority Christian Democratic Union party and as such can be seen as representative of Germany’s unique stance on the question of genocide which is a logical extension of Germany’s own struggle to come to terms with its history. The difference between Germany and Turkey, as stated before, lies in the foundations of each nation’s ontological security, with the current German national identity being predicated on the denouncement of fascism and Nazism. In contrast, Turkey’s government holds up the Ottoman perpetrators of the Genocide as national heroes and visionaries (Zarakol 2008). The conflict between these two perspectives will doubly reinforce the link between Turkish accession and the Armenian Genocide in the minds of the German people and government.

Other issues which will affect the outcome of all of these countries’ votes will include the perceived consequences of a large influx of Turkish immigrants as well as the concept of the EU as both a geographical and political entity. This view, espoused by President Sarkozy of France, rules out Turkish membership based on not only its location, but its considerable cultural and governmental incompatibilities. As such, it is claimed Turkey’s relationship with the EU should be that of a “privileged partner” sans the status and feared consequences of full EU membership (ICG 2007). Of course, the process of reform that Turkey is subjected to as it continues in its attempts to meet EU requirements may change these perceptions in Europe during the next 5 to 15 years, which is the projected timeframe for Turkey to eventually meet those requirements (EurActiv 2007). Changes in Germany, France, and Austria will have occurred as well and factoring these into the analysis process will be crucial to predicting and understanding the eventual outcome.

The importance of Turkey’s accession to the EU and its impact on both the “Christian” and Muslim worlds cannot be understated. Turkey, while largely disconnected from the regimes of the Middle East due to its very acceptance of democracy, will stand as a shining example to other Muslim states if it is successful, and will have a significant impact on the ideology and objectives of these Muslim nations far into the future. While there is a great deal of opposition within the European community, it is by no means clear how the situation will be played out when Turkish membership comes up for a vote before the nations of the EU as early as 2013 (ICG 2007).

However, it is certain that the actions of the three most influential nations opposed to Turkish accession on both political and ideological grounds will have a major effect on the votes of the remainder of the EU nations, and consequently on Turkey and the Islamic world. While acknowledgement of Turkish involvement in the Genocide would not, in and of itself, ensure accession to the EU, “its absence might very well keep Turkey out” (Zarakol 2008). This study will attempt to determine the probability of the outcomes between Austria, France, and Germany using the LAMP method developed by Dr. Jonathan Lockwood. This method, in the opinion of the researcher, is best equipped to bring about “the construction, prediction, and analysis of alternate futures” essential to effective predictive analysis and systematically accounting for all futures (Lockwood 1996).

Steps 4 & 5:

The Possible Courses of Action, Major Scenarios, and Assumptions

There are two courses of action available to the three actors (Austria, France, and Germany) on the question of Turkish accession to the EU:

  1. Acceptance: Austria, France, and Germany or any combination thereof approves Turkish accession to the EU upon Turkey’s satisfaction of EU requirement as set forth in the acquis communaitaire as early as 2013 or as late as 2023. This will require a unanimous vote from all EU members and the support of these three nations will put major political pressure on any holdout members acting on a purely ideological basis.
  2. Rejection: Austria, France, and Germany or any combination thereof moves to block Turkish accession to the EU upon their satisfaction of the acquis requirements. The blocking nation or nations may offer counter-proposals such as granting “Privileged Partner” status or seek perpetual delay in the accession process by demanding additional requirements, such as Turkish recognition of the Armenian Genocide, be met.

Major Scenarios

The three potential scenarios the EU actors will face in relation to Turkey’s accession and its position on the Armenian Genocide are as follows:

  1. Denial of Responsibility: This is the current status quo position of the Turkish government, which has made gargantuan efforts to prevent other nations from formally acknowledging the Genocide while at the same time criminalizing the open discussion of the issue by its own citizens. However, as consensus within the European community coalesces around the Armenian viewpoint, the position of total denial and suppression will become increasingly difficult for Turkey to maintain, and perhaps even be untenable by 2013 and onward.
  2. Partial Acknowledgment: Ongoing reforms and a desire to appease public sentiment in the European community force the Turkish government to make concessions on their policies relating to the Armenian Genocide. The least painful of these would be the complete or partial repeal of Article 301, which even in its amended form, allows for criminal prosecution of Turkish citizens. Other, more difficult, actions would include apologies to Armenia for actions taken under war-time constraints leading to the deaths of 300,000 persons, as well as a normalization of relations with Armenia to include opening the border between the two nations. This scenario represents a compromise between the two extremes above and below and is therefore the most likely COA for Turkey.
  3. Full Acknowledgement: The Turkish government repeals Article 301 in its entirety allowing for the open discussion of the Armenian Genocide by its citizens. Consequently, growing political movements within Turkey recognize the need to make amends for past atrocities (i.e. genocide) committed against the Armenians residing in Turkey during the time of WWI and the Turkish government issues a formal apology. In addition, relations with Armenia are normalized, the border is opened, and possible reparations are discussed. This represents the least desirable outcome from Turkey’s current perspective, and its government will go to great lengths to prevent it.
    Assumptions

Both the actor COAs and major scenarios are dependent on the following assumptions:

  1. Continuation of Democratic Government: Turkey has been subjected to military coups in recent years without suffering much damage, but the overthrow of Turkey’s current democratic government to a military or religious system would bring the reform process necessary to EU accession to a crashing halt (Bolkestein 2006). Foreign relations with EU nations would be severely strained as well and if this were to occur in the near future Turkey would have little chance of ever joining the EU.
  2. Continuation of Non-aggression Policy: Turkey’s current standoff with the Greek Cypriot government as well and its concerns regarding Kurdish Worker Party (PKK) elements in Northern Iraq have the potential to boil over into major conflicts (Kamiya 2007). Turkey must continue to pursue a course of diplomatic resolution to these issues or it will likely find itself politically isolated with EU accession being the least of its concerns.
  3. Continuation of EU Mandated Reforms: There is a great deal of frustration within Turkey regarding the many delays and obstacles that must be overcome to implement necessary reforms. As a result, many conservative and nationalist factions within Turkey are becoming more popular and powerful in their opposition to EU accession (ICG 2007). If this trend continues, and the Turkish government eventually reaches the conclusion that membership in the EU is not in the country’s best interests, then there would be no need for an EU vote on the issue.
  4. Mutual Knowledge of Actors’ Positions: In order for the votes of one nation to influence that of the others, the likely positions on Turkish accession of all 3 nations must be known to each of the governments. If such information were not public knowledge, or were not shared through diplomatic means, then the dependencies under analysis in this study would be forfeit. In France’s case, where the issue would be decided by referendum, accurate polling data would be required.

Steps 6, 7, & 8

    Analysis of the Alternative Futures

When analyzing alternative futures, the total number of permutations (pairwise comparisons in LAMP) can be determined by usage of the formula XY=Z, where X is the number of COAs available to each actor, Y is the total number of actors involved, and Z represents the total number of alternative futures to be considered for a scenario. The equation yields: 2COAs3 actors = 8 alternative futures per scenario.

With 3 scenarios, that brings the total number of alternative futures to be considered in this study to 24. The breakouts of the pairwise comparisons in each scenario are illustrated in the following charts.

Scenario 1: Denial of Responsibility

Future

Austria

France

Germany

Votes

№ 1

Accept

Accept

Accept

3

№ 2

Accept

Accept

Reject

1

№ 3

Accept

Reject

Reject

1

№ 4

Accept

Reject

Accept

4

№ 5

Reject

Reject

Reject

7

№ 6

Reject

Reject

Accept

6

№ 7

Reject

Accept

Accept

5

№ 8

Reject

Accept

Reject

1

Scenario 3: Full Acknowledgment

Future

Austria

France

Germany

Votes

№ 1

Accept

Accept

Accept

7

№ 2

Accept

Accept

Reject

2

№ 3

Accept

Reject

Reject

0

№ 4

Accept

Reject

Accept

2

№ 5

Reject

Reject

Reject

1

№ 6

Reject

Reject

Accept

6

№ 7

Reject

Accept

Accept

6

№ 8

Reject

Accept

Reject

4

Scenario 2: Partial Acknowledgment

Future

Austria

France

Germany

Votes

№ 1

Accept

Accept

Accept

4

№ 2

Accept

Accept

Reject

1

№ 3

Accept

Reject

Reject

1

№ 4

Accept

Reject

Accept

4

№ 5

Reject

Reject

Reject

4

№ 6

Reject

Reject

Accept

7

№ 7

Reject

Accept

Accept

6

№ 8

Reject

Accept

Reject

1

Accept=Vote to approve Turkish accession

Reject=Vote to deny Turkish accession

Alternative futures are then ranked by the number of votes received to determine the most likely future given the conditions prevalent in each of the 3 scenarios.

Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Ranking Future Votes Future Votes Future Votes
1 № 5 7 № 6 7 № 1 7
2 № 6 6 № 7 6 № 6 6
3 № 7 5 № 1 4 № 7 6
4 № 4 4 № 4 4 № 8 4
5 № 1 3 № 5 4 № 2 2
6 № 8 1 № 2 1 № 4 2
7 № 3 1 № 3 1 № 5 1
8 № 2 1 № 8 1 № 3 0

Steps 9 & 10

    The Consequences and Potentials of Transposition

As can be seen in the table above, the only significant commonality between the 3 scenarios would be the rankings of Futures 6 and 7 in the top 3 across all scenarios, which both represent Austria rejecting Turkey’s EU bid, in Future 6 unilaterally and in Future 7 in concert with France. This is attributable to Austria’s unmitigated opposition to Turkey on cultural and ideological grounds, revealing a relative intransigence to Turkish acknowledgment of the Genocide in comparison to the likes of Germany and France.

Future 1 and Future 5 are polar opposites of either total acceptance or total rejection. These 2 outcomes are roughly evenly ranked, with a slight edge going to Future 1 based on its above average performance in all 3 scenarios. Even in Scenario 1 (Denial), Future 1 ranked in the intermediate range with 3 votes. In contrast, Future 5 did not perform nearly as well in Scenario 3 (Full Acknowledgment) receiving only 1 vote. In Scenario 2 (Partial Acknowledgment) the 2 futures received equal votes, but in a direct pairwise comparison, Future 1 once again prevailed. This trend reflects the major inroads Turkey can expect to achieve with France and Germany if it makes even moderate progress on the Genocide issue.

So in summation, the three most likely futures across all scenarios are:

  1. France and Austria reject Turkey’s EU bid while Germany accepts
  2. Austria unilaterally rejects Turkey’s EU bid
  3. All 3 nations vote to accept Turkey’s EU bid

These top 3 futures will be analyzed in depth to provide greater understanding of the consequences involved in each. The remaining alternative futures will be addressed later in a section covering the potentials of transposition. As each future is analyzed, the followed concerns for each actor will be considered:

  • Impacts to political influence internally and throughout the EU
  • Implications for cultural identity both as a nation and member of the EU
  • Prospects for economic growth and/or decline

Scenario 1 – Denial of Responsibility

    Future 6: France and Austria Reject Turkey’s EU Bid
    Politics Culture Economy
    Austria Positive Positive Neutral
    France Positive Positive Neutral
    Germany Neutral Neutral Positive

This is one of the most likely futures in Scenario 1 due to France and Austria’s pre-existent bias to Turkish accession. The Genocide issue will give both nations another justification in blocking Turkey, and both will receive political boosts in the EU and locally. Culturally speaking, France and Austria will reinforce their respective national identities as European nations who are part of a European Union, both in a political and geographical sense. Germany, who had taken a public stance against the Genocide, will also have to appease its growing population of Turkish immigrants, thus negating any political benefits it may have garnered by its support of the Turkish accession. Economic dynamics will, on the whole remain unchanged as Turkey will not have any reason to alter its relationship with Germany, and there may be some slight economic benefits to Germany if Turkey is granted Privileged Partner status

Future 7: Austria unilaterally rejects Turkey’s EU bid
Politics Culture Economy
Austria Neutral Positive Neutral
France Neutral Neutral Positive
Germany Neutral Neutral Positive

Future 7 represents a situation in which a single nation, Austria, has elected to stand alone against the consensus of the other EU nations. As such, Austria can expect to be viewed as holding back progress, though it can still justify its position by citing the Genocide issue. This will likely temper any political influence it may have gained by acting unilaterally. In France, the referendum on Turkish accession will likely have been split down the middle, so there will be negligible effects politically and culturally. On the other hand, both Germany and, to a lesser extent, France can expect to receive a slight economic boost from Turkey as a Privileged Partner.

Future 1: All 3 nations accept Turkey’s EU bid
Politics Culture Economy
Austria Negative Negative Negative
France Negative Negative Neutral
Germany Positive Neutral Positive

This is one of the least likely futures in Scenario 1, but would be a largely negative situation for Austria, France, and the EU in general. Despite diplomatic pressure and legislative resolutions, Turkey has prevailed in its efforts to influence, and perhaps coerce, the most influential nations in the EU. Its successes in France and Austria would be indicative of its substantial political acumen, and this combined with its massive population, the largest in the EU by 2015 (ICG 2007), would spell a major shift in the balance of power from France, though German politicians would enjoy increased support from a growing Turkish population. Turkey, with its struggling economy, would be in a position to capitalize on both entitlements and economic incentives, growing at the expense of other EU member nations while mostly benefiting Germany (Hughes 2004). This would also have damaging effects on the EU’s cultural identity, with Turkish mastery seeming to represent the overall weakness of the union and exacerbating the already simmering hostilities towards Turkey in Austria and France. This could eventually lead to actions by those two states to drastically weaken EU sovereignty and influence both regionally and globally.

Scenario 2 – Partial Acknowledgment

Future 6: France and Austria Reject Turkey’s EU Bid
Politics Culture Economy
Austria Positive Positive Neutral
France Neutral Positive Neutral
Germany Neutral Neutral Positive

This is the most likely future in Scenario 2 due to France and Austria’s pre-existent bias to Turkish accession. The Genocide issue will give both nations a partial justification in blocking Turkey, though only Austria can expect to receive a political boost given the concessions made by Turkey. Culturally speaking, Austria and France will reinforce their respective national identities as European nations both politically and geographically. Germany, who had taken a public stance against the Genocide, will also have to appease its growing population of Turkish immigrants, thus negating any political benefits it may have garnered by its supporting Turkish accession. Economic dynamics will, on the whole remain unchanged as Turkey will not have any reason to alter its relationship with Germany, and there may be some slight economic benefits to Germany if Turkey is granted Privileged Partner status.

Future 7: Austria unilaterally rejects Turkey’s EU bid
Politics Culture Economy
Austria Negative Positive Neutral
France Neutral Neutral Positive
Germany Neutral Neutral Positive

Austria will have difficult justifying its position given the Turkish concessions on the Genocide. This will have a definite negative impact on Austria’s influence within the EU, though culturally speaking, Austria will stand resolute. In France, the referendum on Turkish accession will likely have been split down the middle, so there will negligible effects politically and culturally. On the other hand, both Germany and, to a lesser extent, France can expect to receive a slight economic boost from Turkey as a Privileged Partner.

Future 1: All 3 nations accept Turkey’s EU bid
Politics Culture Economy
Austria Neutral Neutral Neutral
France Neutral Neutral Positive
Germany Positive Neutral Positive

This is a much more likely outcome in Scenario 2 than in Scenario 1, as any concession by Turkey on the Genocide would be viewed as a political victory for the EU. This could easily strike a chord within the European community, leading to increased popular support for Turkish accession, while at the same time curbing Turkish ambitions. In Austria, even though popular support would be against Turkey, Turkey’s perceived diminished status would be a counterbalance. In France and Germany, both could expect economic benefits from a Turkish economy refined by years of reforms and functioning as a full member of the EU.

Scenario 3 – Full Acknowledgment

Future 1: All 3 nations accept Turkey’s EU bid
Politics Culture Economy
Austria Neutral Neutral Neutral
France Positive Neutral Positive
Germany Positive Positive Positive

This is the most likely outcome in Scenario 3, demonstrating to what degree Turkey can determine its own fate in regards to EU accession. Having issued a full apology and normalized relations with Armenia, Turkey will be viewed by member nations in the EU as having the moral initiative, and France, Germany, and even Austria will be hard pressed to deny its entry. Turkey will also have aptly demonstrated its willingness to compromise, thus strengthening the leading members of the EU and defining Turkey’s place within it. In Austria, even though popular support would be against Turkey, Turkey’s perceived diminished status would be a counterbalance. In France and Germany, both could expect economic benefits from a Turkish economy refined by years of reforms and operating as a full member of the EU.

Future 6: France and Austria Reject Turkey’s EU Bid
Politics Culture Economy
Austria Neutral Positive Neutral
France Neutral Positive Neutral
Germany Neutral Negative Positive

This outcome remains a very strong possibility even given complete Turkish acknowledgment of the Genocide. This is in a large part due to the fact that countries seeking to deny Turkish accession based simply on the fact that Turkey isn’t “European” enough will require support from other EU members. In this case, France and Austria would form a coalition to defend the cultural integrity of the EU, a coalition that other EU nations with similar aspirations would be tempted to rally around. Culturally speaking, Austria and France will reinforce their respective national identities as European nations both politically and geographically. Germany however will face some difficult challenges in dealing with its large Turkish population in the aftermath of the Turkey’s accession defeat. Economic dynamics will, on the whole, remain unchanged as Turkey will not have any reason to alter its relationship with Germany, and there may be some slight economic benefits to Germany if Turkey is granted Privileged Partner status.

Future 7: Austria unilaterally rejects Turkey’s EU bid
Politics Culture Economy
Austria Negative Positive Negative
France Neutral Neutral Positive
Germany Neutral Negative Positive

Austria will have extreme difficulty in justifying its position given the complete Turkish concessions on the Genocide. This will have a profound negative impact on Austria’s influence within the EU both politically and economically, though culturally speaking, the nation will stand resolute. In France, the referendum on Turkish accession will likely have been split down the middle, so there will be negligible effects politically and culturally. On the other hand, both Germany and, to a lesser extent, France can expect to receive a slight economic boost from Turkey as a Privileged Partner. From Turkey’s standpoint, this outcome is a worst case scenario and could conceivably lead to the establishment of a religious or military regime focused on military expansion.

The Potentials of Transposition

Political dynamics and maneuvering will shape the EU accession process for Turkey. Even though a single actor can shape this particular outcome, at least in the case of blocking Turkey, there will be a strong incentive to take this stand as part of a unified front regardless of the outcome. The particular concerns of the member nations in any of the 8 alternative futures in each scenario will be, with the notable exception of Austria, swept up in this wind of solidarity and 4 different futures will emerge:

  1. Future 6 – France and Austria reject Turkey’s accession
  2. Future 7 – Austria rejects Turkey’s accession
  3. Future 1 – All 3 nations approve Turkey’s accession
  4. Future 5 – All 3 nations reject Turkey’s accession

    Scenario 1 – Total Denial
    Future Event: Likely Transposition:
    № 1 All 3 accept Future 6-France and Austria reject
    № 2 Germany rejects Future 1-All 3 approve
    № 3 Germany & France reject Future 5-All 3 reject
    № 4 France rejects Future 6-France and Austria reject
    № 5 All 3 reject None
    № 6 Austria and France reject None
    № 7 Austria rejects Future 6-France and Austria reject
    № 8 Austria and Germany reject Future 5-All 3 reject

Scenario 2 – Partial Acknowledgment
Future Event: Likely Transposition:
№ 1 All 3 accept None
№ 2 Germany rejects Future 1-All 3 approve
№ 3 Germany & France reject Future 5-All 3 reject
№ 4 France rejects Future 6-France and Austria reject
№ 5 All 3 reject Future 6-France and Austria reject
№ 6 Austria and France reject None
№ 7 Austria rejects None
№ 8 Austria and Germany reject Future 5-All 3 reject

Scenario 3 – Full Acknowledgment
Future Event: Likely Transposition:
№ 1 All 3 accept None
№ 2 Germany rejects Future 1-All 3 approve
№ 3 Germany & France reject Future 5-All 3 reject
№ 4 France rejects Future 1-All 3 approve
№ 5 All 3 reject Future 6-France and Austria reject
№ 6 Austria and France reject None
№ 7 Austria rejects Future 1-All 3 approve
№ 8 Austria and Germany reject Future 5-All 3 reject

Steps 11 and 12:

The Focal Events and the Indicators

The following are the focal events and associated indicators for Austria France, or Germany which would indicate an alternative future in which Turkey’s EU accession will be rejected:

  • Attempts to delay Turkey’s accession progress
    • Calls for “open-ended” negotiation with Turkey with no guarantees of progression or accession
    • Makes proposition for granting of “Privileged Partner” status to Turkey without consideration of full EU membership
    • Attempts to freeze chapters of the EU acquis
  • Major swings in public opinion against Turkish accession
    • Opinion polls showing very little support for Turkey
    • Growth in influence of nationalist movements with focus on preserving cultural identity
    • Backlash in media against Islamic states
  • Passage of parliamentary resolutions
    • Resolutions acknowledging historicity of Genocide
    • Resolution demanding normalization of Turkish foreign relations with Armenia before considering EU membership

The following are the focal events and associated indicators for Austria France, or Germany which would indicate an alternative future in which Turkey’s EU accession will be accepted:

  • Significant progress in Turkish accession progress
    • Calls for the opening of acquis chapters formerly closed by the EU Enlargement Committee
    • Statements by government leadership congratulating and encouraging Turkish development
    • Proposals for definitive dates and timelines to be applied to the Turkish accession process
  • Growing public support for Turkey
    • Genocide concessions receive acclaim throughout EU
    • Lessening of resentment towards Islamic nations in the media
    • Opinion polls showing a closing of the gap necessary for referendums on accession to pass
  • Growing importance of Turkey in regional stability
    • New Iraqi democracy turns to Turkey for economic and military support
    • Turkey further establishes itself as a critical regional player in the energy sector
    • Turkey opens border with Armenia creating positive economic situation for both nations

Conclusion

In recent months, the EU Enlargement Committee has opened two additional acquis chapters necessary for Turkish accession, telegraphing its intentions to Turkey to take definitive steps in committing to Turkey’s eventual EU membership. However, as long as the Turkish government continues to suppress basic human rights inherent to democracy such as freedom of expression, it’s supposedly inevitable accession will likely face insurmountable obstacles at every milestone. Unless Turkey repeals Article 301and normalizes foreign relations with multiple nations it currently treats as adversaries, it will not have demonstrated to the European community the sincerity of its actions.

The Armenian Genocide plays a pivotal role and the fact of the matter is that Turkey controls its own fate in regards to EU accession, and unless it takes some action to acknowledge the Genocide, regardless of how painful that action may initially be, it will, in all likelihood, ultimately fail to join the EU. This is because the issue transcends the Genocide alone, and Turkey’s continued denial of responsibility will reflect on its true motivations in joining the EU. If it is doing so merely for the economic and political benefits, while at the same time eschewing the cultural and democratic ideals of European society, nothing will better reflect that than Turkey’s obstinate refusal to recognize the failings in its own history and national identity. The horrific atrocities of the 20th century, such as the Jewish Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide, were learning points for European civilizations, with many nations, such as Germany redefining themselves as a people and vowing never again to repeat such grievous mistakes, thus forming the crucible from which the EU itself was forged. And so the question remains, will Turkey choose to follow this same path into a new Europe? Turkey’s treatment of the Armenian Genocide, almost 100 years after its execution, will, to a large degree, answer that question.

Appendix I

Map of Turkey – CIA World Book of Facts (CIA 2008)

Your browser may not support display of this image.

Republic of Turkey

Bordering States: Armenia 268 km, Azerbaijan 9 km, Bulgaria 240 km, Georgia 252 km, Greece 206 km, Iran 499 km, Iraq 352 km, Syria 822 km

International Participation: ADB (nonregional members), Australia Group, BIS, BSEC, CE, CERN (observer), EAPC, EBRD, ECO, EU (applicant), FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, MIGA, NATO, NEA, NSG, OAS (observer), OECD, OIC, OPCW, OSCE, PCA, SECI, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNMIS, UNOCI, UNOMIG, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WEU (associate), WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC

International Disputes: Complex maritime, air, and territorial disputes with Greece in the Aegean Sea; status of north Cyprus question remains; Syria and Iraq protest Turkish hydrological projects to control upper Euphrates waters; Turkey has expressed concern over the status of Kurds in Iraq; border with Armenia remains closed over Nagorno-Karabakh

Appendix II

Turkey EU Timeline (EurActiv 2007)

  • Feb. 1952: Turkey becomes a full member of NATO.
  • Sept. 1959: Ankara applies for associate membership of the European Economic Community
  • Sept. 1963: The Ankara Agreement (an association agreement) is signed to take Turkey to Customs Union and finally to full EEC membership. The first financial protocol is also signed.
  • Nov. 1970: The Additional Protocol and the second financial protocol signed in Brussels.
  • Jan. 1973: The Additional Protocol enters into force. It sets out comprehensively how the Customs Union would be established
  • July 1974: Turkey invades Cyprus.
  • During the first half of the 1980s, relations between Turkey and the Community come to a virtual freeze following the military coup d’etat on 12 September 1980.
  • June 1980: The Association Council decides to decrease customs duties on almost all agricultural products to “zero” by 1987.
  • Sept. 1986: The Turkey-EEC Association Council meeting revives the association process.
  • 14 April 1987: Turkey applies for full EEC membership.
  • Dec. 1989: The Commission endorses Turkey’s eligibility for membership but defers the assessment of its application.
  • March 1995: Turkey-EU Association Council finalizes the agreement on the Customs Union, which enters into force on 1 January 1996.
  • Dec. 1997: At the Luxembourg Summit, EU leaders decline to grant candidate status to Turkey.
  • Dec. 1999: EU Helsinki Council decides on the candidate status of Turkey.
  • March 2001: The EU Council of Ministers adopts EU-Turkey Accession Partnership.
  • March 2001: The Turkish government adopts the National Programme of Turkey for the adoption of EU laws.
  • Sept. 2001: Turkish parliament adopts over 30 amendments to the constitution in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership.
  • Aug. 2002: The Turkish Parliament passes sweeping reforms to meet the EU’s human rights criteria.
  • 13 Dec. 2002: The Copenhagen European Council resolves that if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey. In the meantime, EU leaders have agreed to extend and deepen co-operation on the EC-Turkey Customs Union and to provide Turkey with increased pre-accession financial assistance.
  • May 2003: The EU Council of Ministers decides on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions of the Accession Partnership with Turkey.
  • Jan. 2004: Turkey signs protocol banning death penalty in all circumstances, a move welcomed by the EU.
  • March 2004: Council of Europe recommends ending monitoring of Turkey.
  • Oct. 2004: Commission issues progress report on Turkey.
  • 17 Dec. 2004: European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 – with strings attached.
  • 23 May 2005: Turkey names Economy Minister Ali Babacan as the country’s chief accession negotiator.
  • 1 June 2005: Turkey’s revised penal code, first adopted in September 2004, enters into force.
  • 17 June 2005: The Council reiterates the EU’s determination to proceed with the enlargement process.
  • 29 June 2005: The Commission presents its “rigorous” negotiating framework to Ankara.
  • 29 July 2005: Turkey signs protocol to Ankara agreement, extending EU-15 customs union to the ten new member states including Cyprus. Ankara also issues a declaration on the non-recognition of Cyprus.
  • 21 Sept. 2005: The EU approves its counter-declaration on Turkey’s 29 July declaration.
  • 3 Oct. 2005: Accession talks symbolically opened with Turkey.
  • 23 Jan. 2006: The Council decides on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey.
  • 16 March: The European Parliament adopts a resolution based on a report by Elmar Brok on the Commission’s enlargement strategy paper.
  • 12 Apr. 2006: The Selection Panel for the European Capital of Culture 2010 recommends Istanbul.
  • 12 June 2006: The EU starts concrete accession negotiations with Turkey. The negotiating framework specifies 35 chapters. Each chapter needs to be unanimously opened and closed by the Council. The Council agrees on opening and closure of the chapter on science and research.
  • 12-27 July 2006: The court ruling on “Turkishness” in the case of Hrant Dink sends an ambivalent signal to the EU and raises concerns over freedom of expression in Turkey.
  • 31 July 2006: Hardliner General Yasar Büyükanit is appointed chief of the Turkish military.
  • 4 Sept. 2006: European Parliament votes a report concerning Turkey’s progress on preparing for membership. The report says that Turkey had made insufficient progress in the areas of freedom of expression, minority rights, corruption and violence against women.
  • 8 Nov. 2006: Commission publishes a critical report on Turkey’s accession progress.
  • 29 Nov. 2006: The Commission recommended to partially suspend membership negotiations with Turkey due to lack of progress on the Cyprus issue.
  • 11 Dec. 2006: EU foreign ministers decided to follow the Commission’s recommendations and suspend talks with Turkey on eight of the 35 negotiating areas.
  • 26 June 2007: Two further negotiating chapters, on statistics and financial control, were opened, however the opening of the chapter on economic and monetary union was taken off the agenda.
  • 22 July 2007: Erdogan’s ruling AKP gets re-elected with 47% of votes at early Parliamentary elections.
  • 24 Oct 2007: Parliament issued its annual resolution on the state of Turkey’s membership bid.
  • 6 Nov 2007: Commission published its annual enlargement report on Turkey’s progress in membership talks. The Commission recommended not to begin further negotiations on matters of justice and basic rights as long as Turkish criminal law is not reformed.
  • Over the coming weeks further negotiations in the spheres of health and transport are to be opened.
  • The negotiation process is said to be “open-ended”. Negotiations are expected to take at least 10-15 years.
  • 29 Nov. 2006: The Commission recommended to

Appendix III

Current Status of Acquis Communaitaire Chapters (EC-E 2008)

Acquis chapter EC assessment at start Screening started Screening completed Chapter Opened Chapter Closed Chapter Frozen
1. Free Movement of Goods Further efforts needed 16.1.2006 24.2.2006 11.12.06
2. Freedom of Movement for Workers Very hard to adopt 19.7.2006 11.9.2006
3. Right of Establishment for companies & Freedom to provide Services Very hard to adopt 21.11.2005 20.12.2005 3.10.2005 11.12.06
4. Free Movement of Capital Further efforts needed 25.11.2005 22.12.2005
5. Public Procurement Totally incompatible with acquis 7.11.2005 28.11.2005
6. Company Law Considerable efforts needed 21.6.2006 20.7.2006 3.10.2005
7. Intellectual Property Law Further efforts needed 6.2.2006 3.3.2006
8. Competition Policy Very hard to adopt 8.11.2005 2.12.2005
9. Financial Services Considerable efforts needed 29.3.2006 3.5.2006 3.10.2005 11.12.06
10. Information Society & Media Further efforts needed 12.6.2006 14.7.2006 3.10.2005
11. Agriculture & Rural Development Very hard to adopt 5.12.2005 26.1.2006 11.12.06
12. Food safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy Very hard to adopt 9.3.2006 28.4.2006
13. Fisheries Very hard to adopt 24.2.2006 31.3.2006 11.12.06
14. Transport Policy Considerable efforts needed 26.6.2006 28.9.2006 11.12.06
15. Energy Considerable efforts needed 15.5.2006 16.6.2006
16. Taxation Considerable efforts needed 6.6.2006 12.7.2006
17. Economic & Monetary Policy Considerable efforts needed 16.2.2006 23.3.2006
18. Statistics Considerable efforts needed 19.6.2006 18.7.2006 25.06.2007
19. Social Policy & Employment Considerable efforts needed 8.2.2006 22.3.2006
20. Enterprise & Industrial Policy No major difficulties expected 27.3.2006 5.5.2006 29.03.2007
21. Trans-European Networks Considerable efforts needed 30.6.2006 29.9.2006 19.12.2007[19]
22. Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments Considerable efforts needed 11.9.2006 10.10.2006
23. Judiciary & Fundamental Rights Considerable efforts needed 7.9.2006 13.10.2006
24. Justice, Freedom & Security Considerable efforts needed 23.1.2006 15.2.2006
25. Science & Research No major difficulties expected 20.10.2005 14.11.2005 12.06.2006 12.06.2006
26. Education & Culture Further efforts needed 26.10.2005 16.11.2005
27. Environment Totally incompatible with acquis 3.4.2006 2.6.2006
28. Consumer & Health Protection Further efforts needed 8.6.2006 11.7.2006 19.12.2007[20]
29. Customs Union No major difficulties expected 31.1.2006 14.3.2006 11.12.06
30. External Relations No major difficulties expected 10.7.2006 13.9.2006 11.12.06
31. Foreign, Security & Defence Policy Further efforts needed 14.9.2006 6.10.2006
32. Financial Control Further efforts needed 18.5.2006 30.6.2006 3.10.2005
33. Financial & Budgetary Provisions No major difficulties expected 6.9.2006 4.10.2006
34. Institutions
35. Other Issues

Appendix IV

Alternate Study – Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

Research Design

This alternate study will be employed to determine which course of action Germany will take when it votes on Turkey’s accession to the EU as early as 2013, with consideration given to Turkey’s progress in regards to the Armenian Genocide. The following hypotheses, based on established international relations perspectives, will represent Germany’s possible approaches to the situation.

Hypothesis 1 (Realism): Germany will view moderate Turkish concessions on the Genocide as influential diplomatic victories and will thus be inclined to support Turkey’s EU membership if such concessions are made.

Hypothesis 2 (Globalism): Germany will focus primarily on the economic impact of Turkey’s accession and thus will not consider Turkey’s acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide in its decision.

Hypothesis 3 (Constructivism): Germany’s top priority will be to preserve its own cultural identity as well as the EU’s and thus will only be inclined to support Turkey’s accession if full acknowledgment of Turkish culpability in the Armenian Genocide is made.

This study will be qualitative due to the subjective nature of both the dependent and independent variables. The independent variables include Turkey’s current position on the Armenian Genocide, forecasted economic impacts of Turkish accession, and the dominant image adopted by German leaders. The dependent variable is the degree to which Turkey’s position on the Armenian Genocide will influence Germany’s vote on its accession to the EU.

Pattern matching, a technique commonly utilized in quantitative analysis (Collier 2006), will be used here in its basic narrative form. The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) technique will be used to identify hypotheses, prepare evidence that supports or refutes each hypothesis, and then refine that evidence based on diagnosticity, or ability to “determine the likelihood of one hypothesis versus another” (Heuer 1999). Critical evidence will be arrayed against hypotheses using a simple matrix, with each evidential item rated with a ‘+’ for support, ‘-‘ for refutation, and ‘/’ for no effect.

The dominant image has been somewhat artificially attached to each separate hypothesis, i.e. realism to a positive outcome, globalism to a negative. This is not to imply that each outcome could not occur within the context of each image. It is understood that multiple scenarios could take place within each. However, this construct has been implemented for both brevity and completeness as the number of hypotheses is limited to 3 while at the same time addressing 3 major international relations perspectives. Additionally, each hypothesis, with the understood exception of Hypothesis 2 (Globalism), is presumed to be symmetrical, so Turkey’s failure to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide might be expected to have an opposite effect on the German vote then stated in the hypotheses.

Case Study/Findings

ACH is a process which endeavors to put all viable solutions on the table at once in an effort to objectively choose between them. It is an intensive 8 step process (see Figure 1) which provides a clear way of accomplishing this.

Figure 1 (Heuer 1999):

Step-by-Step Outline of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses
Step 1 Identify Possible Hypotheses
Step 2 Determine Significant Evidence
Step 3 Analyze diagnosticity
Step 4 Refine the evidence
Step 5 Disprove hypotheses
Step 6 Analyze sensitivity to evidence
Step 7 Report conclusions and likelihood of all the hypotheses
Step 8 Identify milestones for future observation

The first step of identifying possible hypotheses has already been accomplished. The next step of determining significant evidence involves looking at the problem from the realist, globalist, and constructivist perspectives, giving equal weight, or an equivalent number of evidential items to each. In this case, 3 items of evidence will be considered for each image, for a total of 9. The evidence to be considered is detailed in Figure 2.

Figure 2:

Items of Evidence From Each International Relations Image
1 (Realism) Contingent of 2.5 million Turkish immigrants in Turkey
2 (Realism) Historical ties with Turkey during times of war
3 (Realism) Turkey’s stability key to regional security
4 (Globalism) 30 Billion Euros in Bilateral Trade between Germany & Turkey
5 (Globalism) Turkey likely to siphon entitlements from Germany if approved
6 (Globalism) Very large influx of Turkish immigrants to Germany if approved
7 (Constructivism) Bundestag resolution calling on Turkish recognition of Genocide
8 (Constructivism) Acute German awareness of consequences of Holocaust
9 (Constructivism) Turkey’s current policy of Total Denial of Responsibility in Genocide

Step 3 calls for the determination of diagnosticity in relation to each hypotheses for each item of evidence. This will be accomplished by incorporating all 3 hypotheses across the top rows of a matrix, and listing each piece of evidence down the side. Support for or against each hypothesis will be annotated in the inner cells of the table, which should then indicate which items of evidence have high diagnosticity (see Figure 6). However, before this can take place, pattern matching analysis must be conducted for each hypothesis. Figure 3 provides this analysis for Hypothesis 1.

Figure 3:

Pattern Matching Analysis for Hypothesis 1 (Realism – Substantial Effect)
Item # Evidence Rationale Result
1 Significant Turkish Population Germany can appeal to its Turkish population and achieve political gains in EU at same time (+)
2 Historical Ties to Turkey Not likely to effect (/)
3 Turkey Key to Regional Security An EU Turkey would mean even greater stability (+)
4 Significant Bilateral Trade An EU Turkey would mean less trade restrictions (+)
5 Reduction in Entitlements Not likely to effect (/)
6 Large Influx of Immigrants Not likely to effect (/)
7 Bundestag Genocide Resolution Germany has placed its reputation on the line, would achieve political gains if Turkey responds (+)
8 German Awareness of Holocaust Germany eager to assist Turkey in redemption (+)
9 Turkey’s Total Denial Germany wants Turkey to change this position (+)

6 of the 9 evidences support the realist hypothesis, while none refute it. The remaining 3 seem to have no significant effect. Based on the evidence here, a large majority of the evidence, across all perspectives, provides strong support for Hypothesis 1. Next, Hypothesis 2 is examined in Figure 4.

Figure 4:

Pattern Matching Analysis for Hypothesis 2 (Globalism – Null Effect)
Item # Evidence Rationale Result
1 Significant Turkish Population Would provide economic incentive (+)
2 Historical Ties to Turkey Not likely to effect (/)
3 Turkey Key to Regional Security National Security, not just economic, concerns would be critical (-)
4 Significant Bilateral Trade Germany doesn’t want to jeopardize trade agreements with Turkey (+)
5 Reduction in Entitlements Will affect bottom line (+)
6 Large Influx of Immigrants Will affect economy in several ways (+)
7 Bundestag Genocide Resolution Demonstrates consideration of ideological concerns (-)
8 German Awareness of Holocaust Cultural concerns are at the forefront here (-)
9 Turkey’s Total Denial Has been status quo for 90+ years (/)

4 of the 9 evidences support Hypothesis 2, while 3 refute it. The remaining 2 have no effect. This indicates much weaker support for Hypothesis 2 than was the case for Hypothesis 1, and what support is there is found primarily within the Globalist perspective. Next, Hypothesis 3 is examined in Figure 5.

Figure 5:

Pattern Matching Analysis for Hypothesis 3 (m – Null Effect)
Item # Evidence Rationale Result
1 Significant Turkish Population Part of Germany’s cultural identity is its Turkish population (-)
2 Historical Ties to Turkey Not likely to effect (/)
3 Turkey Key to Regional Security Not likely to effect (/)
4 Significant Bilateral Trade Not likely to effect (/)
5 Reduction in Entitlements Not likely to effect (/)
6 Large Influx of Immigrants Nation seeking to preserve cultural identity would want to prevent this (+)
7 Bundestag Genocide Resolution Reflects Germany’s cultural stance on Genocide (+)
8 German Awareness of Holocaust Will regard Genocide acknowledgment as first step to joining EU (+)
9 Turkey’s Total Denial Germany has little sympathy for this policy, given their own struggles in coming to terms with past (+)

4 of the 9 evidences support Hypothesis 3, while only 1 refutes it. The remaining 4 have no effect. This indicates nearly non-existent support for Hypothesis 3 in the constructivist and globalist perspectives. Hypothesis 1 has maintained a substantial lead in terms of number of supporting evidences, but this may change once diagnosticity of the evidence is assessed. Figure 6 reveals the diagnostic outcome.

Figure 6:

Diagnosticity Analysis
Item # Evidence H1 H2 H3 Diagnosticity
1 Significant Turkish Population (+) (+) (-) Moderate
2 Historical Ties to Turkey (/) (/) (/) None
3 Turkey Key to Regional Security (+) (-) (/) Moderate
4 Significant Bilateral Trade (+) (+) (/) Low
5 Reduction in Entitlements (/) (+) (/) Low
6 Large Influx of Immigrants (/) (+) (+) Low
7 Bundestag Genocide Resolution (+) (-) (+) Moderate
8 German Awareness of Holocaust (+) (-) (+) Moderate
9 Turkey’s Total Denial (+) (/) (+) Low

Diagnosticity is designated “High” if the evidence refutes two hypotheses while supporting a third. A “Moderate” designation would result from refuting one hypothesis while possibly supporting at least one other. A “Low” designation comes about from a failure to refute even one hypothesis, while “None” signifies similar results for each.

Steps 4, 5, and 6 of ACH are focused on culling out the evidence with low diagnostic value, then reevaluating the hypotheses using the refined evidence. The more critical a piece of evidence is to the findings, the more closely it should be examined (Heuer 1999). In this case, item 3 has the highest diagnostic value, supporting Hypothesis 1 and refuting Hypothesis 2, while having no effect on Hypothesis 3. While this is not characteristic of what would be termed “High” diagnosticity, it is stronger in this respect the all of the remaining evidences. Evidences 1, 7, and 8 all share equally moderate diagnostic value, with each supporting 2 hypotheses, while at the same time refuting another. Each of the items stands up to closer scrutiny as being well established facts and are not in the realm of speculation. The remaining 5 evidences all have low diagnostic value.

Evidence with moderate diagnosticity will be retained due to its ability to refute at least one hypothesis, which is the primary means by which ACH is used to reach a conclusion (Heuer 1999). Evidence with “Low” or no diagnostic value will only dilute the eventual findings, and will be removed. Figure 7 presents the remaining 4 evidences sorted by diagnosticity.

Figure 7:

Refined Evidential Analysis
Item # Evidence H1 H2 H3 Diagnosticity
3 Turkey Key to Regional Security (+) (-) (/) Moderate
1 Significant Turkish Population (+) (+) (-) Moderate
7 Bundestag Genocide Resolution (+) (-) (+) Moderate
8 German Awareness of Holocaust (+) (-) (+) Moderate

Step 7 of ACH entails the reporting of conclusions drawn from the previous analysis (Heuer 1999). Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 represents the least likely scenario due to the highest number of refutations from the evidence to include item 3, the most critical. Hypothesis 3 is slightly more likely, being refuted only once. However, Hypothesis 1 is the most compelling, garnering support from all 4 items of evidence. As long as no additional evidence is brought to the table, or there is no change in the current situation, then Hypothesis 1, representing a realist perspective in which Turkish concessions relating to the Armenian Genocide will have a substantial effect on Germany’s perception of political achievement, is the only defensible position when predicting the German vote on Turkish accession in relation to the issue in question.

An analytical conclusion is always tentative, and the 8th and final step of ACH accounts for this by specifying what events an intelligence consumer should be on the lookout for that would result in a change to the prediction (Heuer 1999). What appears most obvious in this case is that Germany has placed a great deal of importance on its status as the most powerful and influential nation within the EU. Consequently, it actively seeks to take actions which place it in that role of leadership among national actors. Currently, Germany views Turkey as a younger version of itself, with the same motivations it once had to achieve success on an international level. However, if nationalist movements within Germany were to gain greater influence over the currently moderate government, then Germany’s priorities may very well shift to a greater emphasis on preserving its own “German” identity, which would be in direct opposition to its current stance on Turkish integration. If this were to occur, look for Germany to take similar positions to other EU nations with ethnocentric perspectives, such as Austria and France.

Comparison with LAMP

The contrast between the results achieved in both the LAMP and ACH studies was pronounced. The most obvious difference would be the focus on only one actor, Germany, in ACH. The development of hypotheses to incorporate the actions of multiple actors proved to be a very difficult proposition. LAMP, with its focus on pairwise comparisons and alternative futures, is much better equipped to handle the intricacies and interplay between multiple entities with different goals and perspectives. At the same time, it is a bit cumbersome, even in situations with a relative small number of variables, to include the use of scenarios which have their own difficulties. However, if the relative probabilities of scenarios can be determined outside of LAMP, then LAMP itself becomes much more reliable as a tool for forecasting and monitoring events to determine likely outcomes as situations develop.

Interestingly, it is in the determination of the likelihood of these same scenarios that ACH excels. With its focus on a single actor and criticality of evidence it lends itself to more focused studies that could conceivably be used in conjunction with LAMP to provide and verify the likelihood of individual scenarios. In this case, instead of focusing on Germany, ACH could have been employed to predict which actions Turkey would take in acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide as it faced multiple pressures in its bid to join the EU. Both of these predictive techniques, used in concert, would be valuable tools in the analytical toolbox of intelligence analysts tasked with incredibly complex projects such as a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Finally, it is important to remember that either of these methods can only be as reliable as the evidence upon which they are constructed.
Bibliography

Armtown (2007) “HR 106 Fallout: Turkey recalls US ambassador” armtown.com, Available from: http://www.armtown.com/news/en/anw/20071012/2539/

Bolkestein, F. (2006) “Turkish entry would fatally dilute the Union” Financial Times, Available from: http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.apus.edu/pqdweb?did=1160243781&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientId=62546&RQT=309&VName=PQD

Candar, C. (2006) “French in Armenia ‘genocide’ row” BBC News, Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6043730.stm

CIA (2008) “CIA World Factbook – Turkey”, Central Intelligence Agency, Available from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html

Collier, M. W. (2006) “Basic Research Methods: Compendium of Lesson Handouts”, Available from: https://online.apus.edu/educator/temp/dk228/rc506k001sum07/methods/15665.doc

DW-World (2005) “Germany to Turkey: Own Up to Massacre” Deutsche Welle, Available from: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1560270,00.html

EC-E (2008) “Screening Reports” ec.europa.eu, Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/screening_reports_en.htm

EurActiv (2007) “EU-Turkey relations” EurActiv.com, Available from: http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678

Gannon, J., E. Laipson, et al. (2000) “GLOBAL TRENDS 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts”, National Intelligence Council, Available from: http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2015.html

Gorvett, J. (2007) “Border solution offers peace dividends” Middle East. London NOV 2007, Available from: http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.apus.edu/pqdweb?did=1383347641&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientId=62546&RQT=309&VName=PQD

Gültaşlı, S. (2008) “EU welcomes 301 amendment but calls for more” Today’s Zaman 01 May 2008, Available from: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=140606

Henley, J. (2004) “French poll shows depth of hostility to Turkey” guardian.co.uk, Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/29/turkey.eu

Heuer, R. J. (1999). Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Government Printing Office.

Hughes, K. (2004) “Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement? Exploring the Implications of Turkish Accession”, Friends of Europe, Available from: http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Portals/6/Documents/Reports/Turkey%20and%20the%20European%20Union%20-%20Working%20Paper%20%20FoE.pdf

ICG (2007) “Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead” Europe Report 184, International Crisis Group, Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5021&CFID=42221290&CFTOKEN=28244706

Kamiya, G. (2007) “Genocide: An inconvenient truth” salon.com, Available from: http://www.salon.com/opinion/kamiya/2007/10/16/armenian_genocide/

Lockwood, J. (1996). Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction, DC:JMIC.

Pan, E. (2005) “Turkey’s EU Bid” Council on Foreign Relations, Available from: http://www.cfr.org/publication/8939/turkeys_eu_bid.html

Viotti, P. R. and M. V. Kauppi (1999). International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (3rd Edition), Allyn and Bacon.

Zarakol, A. (2008) “Why so stubborn? States, past crimes, and ontological security: Turkey and Japan” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, International Studies Association, Available from: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251512_index.html

Advertisements

Tags: , , , , , , , ,

2 Responses to “Turkey, EU, and the Armenian Genocide: A LAMP Analysis”

  1. ian in hamburg Says:

    I think there was a comma missing on line 1,435. 🙂

    No seriously, that has got to be the longest post I have yet to read. Or not read.

    Fazit, as the Germans would say: Turkey acknowledges, apologizes and compensates for past wrongdoings, or it’s no EU for you.

  2. schex Says:

    Just a paper that I recently wrote that I wanted to be able to reference online. You’re right about Germany I believe, though they do have to pander to a large (and growing) Turkish population. IMO, France is even more fixated on this issue than Germany.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: